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CRIMINAL LAW-CATCH ME WITH A CAN: NORTH DAKOTA'S
MINOR IN POSSESSION OF ALCOHOL STATUTE REQUIRES
PROOF OF "ACTUAL" POSSESSION
In re K.S., 500 N.W.2d 603 (N.D. 1993)
I.

FACTS

On August 25, 1992, K.S., a juvenile, attended a party at a residence
in Grand Forks, North Dakota.l K.S. went to the party to say good-bye
to her friends before she moved out of town the following day. 2 She
went to the party despite the fact that she knew alcoholic beverages
would be present. 3
The Grand Forks Police went to the house in response to a "loud
party" complaint. 4 After knocking several times on the door and
announcing himself, Officer Ellingson was allowed into the house. 5
Once inside, Ellingson discovered one bottle of vodka, nine opened cans
of beer, and numerous empty beer cans. 6 The investigating officer also
discovered K.S. hiding in an upstairs closet with a male friend who had
been drinking. 7
At the time K.S. was discovered, she had been at the party for
approximately thirty minutes, had neither consumed nor intended to
consume any alcoholic beverages, and had not exercised any degree of
control over any of the alcohol. 8 Nevertheless, K.S. was charged with the
"unruly offense" of minor in possession of an alcoholic beverage in
violation of section 5-01-08 of the North Dakota Century Code. 9
Upon a judicial hearing, the referee ruled that K.S. was guilty of the
offense. However, pursuant to K.S.'s written request for review, the
Northeast Central Judicial District Juvenile Court "set aside" the judicial
referee's finding that K.S. had committed the "unruly act" of minor in
possession of alcohol.1 0 The state appealed the vacation of the judicial

1. In re K.S., 500 N.W.2d 603. 603 (N.D. 1993).
2. Id. K.S. did not purchase or bring any alcoholic beverages to the party. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. Officer Ellingson testified that while he was waiting for an answer at the door, he became
aware that "juveniles[] began running upstairs-I could hear them running upstairs and I could also
hear them hiding within the house." Id. at 603.
6. In re K.$.. 500 N.W.2d at 603.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 604. K.S. was also charged with the delinquent act of interfering with a public officer in
violation of section 9-0204 of the Ordinances of the City of Grand Forks. Id. The judicial referee
ruled that K.S. was guilty of the offense, and the juvenile court confirmed the referee's finding. Id.
10. In re K.S., 500 N.W.2d at 604. Section 27-05-30 of the North Dakota Century Code
provides, in relevant part, that district courts are to "assign a referee to preside in any case or
proceeding provided for in title 14, chapter 27-20 [which includes all juvenile proceedings], and
chapter 28-25 pursuant to rules of the supreme court." Id. at 604 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE §
27-05-30 (1991)). "The findings and recommendations of the judicial referee are deemed to have the
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referee's findings, arguing that by applying the doctrine of constructive
possession, enough evidence existed to support a judgment of conviction
for the offense.I' The North Dakota Supreme Court, in a majority
opinion written by Justice Meschke, held that the strict liability crime of
minor in possession of an alcoholic beverage required the state to prove
that K.S. was guilty of "actual possession" rather than constructive
possession.1 2 Thus, the juvenile court's order setting aside the conclusion
that K.S. committed the "unruly act" of being a minor in possession of
13
alcohol was affirmed.
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Public policy calling for a more "pragmatic means of facilitating
law enforcement" has dictated that mere possession of contraband such
as narcotics, or alcohol for a minor, is illegal.1 4 Creating a crime of
possession in these instances increases the efficiency of law enforcement
15
because possession is easier to prove than "use, distribution, or sale."
However, "[alithough frequently used in both ordinary speech and at
law, [possession] remains one of the most elusive and ambiguous of legal

constructs."

16

Black's Law Dictionary explains the general theory of criminal
possession as follows:
effect of an order of the district court until superseded by a written order of a district court judge.'"
Id. (quoting N.D. SuPREaM COURT ADMIN. RuLES AND ORDERS Rule 13, § 10(a)). However, "[al
review of the findings and recommendations... shall be ordered if a party files a written request for a
review .... The review by a district court judge shall be a review of the record, unless the court
orders a hearing of the proceeding." Id. (quoting N.D. SUREnMECoURT ADMIN. RULES AND ORDERS,
Rule 13, § 11 (1994)).
11. Id. at 604-06. Section 27-20-56 of the North Dakota Century Code, which controls the
review of a juvenile court judgment, states in relevant part, that "[a]n aggrieved party, including the
state or a subdivision of the state, may appeal from a final order, judgment, or decree of the juvenile
court to the supreme court .....Id. at 605 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-56 (1991)). "The appeal
must be heard by the supreme court upon the files, records, and minutes or transcript of the evidence
of the juvenile court[.l" Id. at 605 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-56 (1991)). Furthermore,
"[alppellate review of the juvenile court is equivalent to the former procedure of trial de novo[,]" and
therefore the evidence is reviewed independently. Id. (citing In re B.S.. 496 N.W.2d 31, 32 (N.D.
1993) and In re J.D.Z., 431 N.W.2d 272, 274 (N.D. 1988)).
12. In re K.S., 500 N.W.2d at 608.
13. Id.
14. Charles H. Whitebread & Ronald Stevens, Constructive Possession in Narcotics Cases: To
Have and Have Not, 58 VA. L. REV. 751, 754 (1972) (regarding the effects of criminalizing
possession). See also George H. Singer, Note. ConstructivePossession of ControlledSubstances: A
North Dakota Look at a Nationwide Problem, 68 N.D. L REv. 981, 982 (1992) (discussing modem
courts' use of a broader interpretation of possession as a matter of public policy).
15. Whitebread & Stevens. supra note 14, at 754 (acknowledging the benefit to law enforcement
officials from the criminalization of possession). See also Singer. supra note 14, at 982 (discussing the
proscription of possession as a more efficient means of law enforcement).
16. Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 14, at 751 (discussing the controversial use of the doctrine
of constructive possession). See also Singer, supra note 14, at 981 (referring to possession as a major
source of controversy in criminal law).
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The law, in general, recognizes two kinds of possession: actual
possession and constructive possession. A person who
knowingly has direct physical control over a thing, at a given
time, is then in actual possession of it. A person who, although
not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the
intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a
thing, either directly or through another person or persons, is
then in constructive possession of it.17
Traditionally, criminal liability for possession was limited to
instances when actual possession existed.1 8 In Tyler v. Commonwealth, 19
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals opined that it is "well-settled law"
that actual or "exclusive" possession, rather than constructive possession,
is required for the imposition of criminal liability. 20 The court reasoned:

[Clonstructive possession, like constructive notice or knowledge, though sufficient to create a civil liability, is not
sufficient to hold the prisoner to a criminal charge. He can
only be required to account for the possession of things which
he actually and knowingly possessed, as, for example, where
they are found upon his person, or in his private apartment, or
2
in a place of which he kept the key. '
However, despite the early courts' traditional approach requiring
proof of actual possession, courts today apply a "more expansive[]"
interpretation of the type of possession that is required for imposing
criminal liability upon an accused. 22 In an effort to further facilitate law
enforcement, modern courts apply the doctrine of constructive
possession as a sufficient means for establishing guilt in possession-type
crimes. 2 3 The doctrine of constructive possession broadens the
application of possession-type crimes to include situations in which

17. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1163 (6th ed. 1990) quoted in In re K.S.. 500 N.W.2d 603, 606
(N.D. 1993).
18. See generally Tyler v. Commonwealth, 91 S.E. 171. 172 (Va. 1917).
19. 91 S.E. 171 (Va. 1917).
20. Tyler v. Commonwealth, 91 S.E. 171, 172 (Va. 1917).
21. Id. (citing 3 SIMON G REENLEAF. A TREATISE ON THE LAW oFEVIDENCE § 33. at 34 (13th ed.
1876)).
22. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.2(e), at 281
(1986) (stating that courts apply a broader definition of possession to include instances when actual
possession cannot be directly proven).
23. State v. Connery, 441 N.W.2d 651. 655 (N.D. 1989) (showing that the possession requirement
for a narcotics conviction can be fulfilled by an affirmative showing of either actual or constructive
possession). See also Commonwealth v. Aviles, 615 A.2d 398, 401 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (stating that
constructive possession is 'a legal fiction, a pragmatic construct [designed] to deal with the realities of
criminal law enforcement").
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actual physical control cannot be directly proven, but a strong inference

24
exists that the defendant actually possessed the substance at one time.
Another principle that courts have applied to ease the burden on law
enforcement officials is the doctrine of strict liability. 25 The doctrine of
strict liability enables guilt to be proven without proof of any criminal
intent or culpability. 2 6 Thus, in possession crimes, defendants could be
found guilty of possession whether they knew they possessed the
contraband or not. 27 Courts have also applied this doctrine in conjunc-

tion with the doctrine of constructive possession, creating a very
powerful enforcement tool by which a defendant could be found guilty
28
of possession for merely being in the presence of the contraband.
The North Dakota Supreme Court's first discussion of the
constructive possession doctrine was in Henry S. Grinde Corp. v.
Klindworth.2 9 Klindworth involved a civil action brought to recover a
broker's commission for the sale of realty. 3 0 In Klindworth the supreme
court determined that constructive possession and partial performance
were insufficient factors to preserve an oral contract from being avoided
by the statute of frauds. 3 1 North Dakota law primarily limited the
application of constructive possession to real property issues, such as in
Klindworth and other related civil actions, 3 2 until State v. Larson.33
Larson represented the supreme court's first discussion of
constructive possession in a criminal proceeding. 3 4 Supreme Court

24. State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609. 610 (Minn. 1975) (defining the purpose of the doctrine of
constructive possession).
25. LAFAVE & SCOTT. supra note 22, § 3.8(c), at 247 (stating that "[t]he reason for having statutes
imposing criminal liability without fault are those of expediency: in some areas of conduct it is
difficult to obtain convictions if the prosecution must prove fault, so enforcement requires strict
liability").
26. Id. See, e.g., State v. Rippley, 319 N.W.2d 129, 133 (N.D. 1982) (finding that the North
Dakota possession statute is a strict liability statute requiring no proof of knowledge or intent).
27. See id. See also State v. Morris, 331 N.W.2d 48. 56-57 (N.D. 1983) (stating that possession
of narcotics is a strict liability offense).
28. Morris, 331 N.W.2d 56-57 (finding that constructive possession does not require that the
defendant have knowledge of the contraband's presence in order to be found guilty of the strict
liability offense).
29. 44 N.W.2d 417, 424 (N.D. 1950) (stating that 'constructive possession is that possession
which the law annexes to the legal title or ownership of property, when there is a right to the
immediate actual possession of such property").
30. Henry S. Grinde Corp. v. Klindworth. 44 N.W.2d 417,424 (N.D. 1950).
31. Id.
32. See State v. Rosenquist, 51 N.W.2d 767, 786 (N.D. 1952) (regarding an adverse claim to
realty and an action to quiet title); Grandin v. Gardiner, 63 N.W.2d 128, 133 (N.D. 1954) (regarding
an adverse claim to realty); Tarnovsky v. Sec. State Bank, 77 N.W.2d 828, 832 (N.D. 1956)
(regarding an action to quiet title).
33. 274 N.W.2d 884 (N.D. 1979).
34. State v. Larson, 274 N.W.2d 884, 886 (N.D. 1979). In Larson, the defendant appealed from
a conviction for possession of heroin, because he was convicted despite testimony from his back seat
passenger who stated that he. not the defendant, maintained exclusive possession over the narcotic
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Commissioner Burdick, in a concurring opinion, stated that possession of
controlled substances "may be actual or constructive, joint or
35
exclusive."
Three years later, the doctrine of constructive possession was again
before the court in a criminal setting; this time it was in the form of a
jury instruction for the offense of conspiracy to distribute a controlled
substance. 36 In State v. Lind,37 the supreme court reviewed the trial
judge's supplemental jury instruction, which stated that possession as
used in the previous instructions could be established by actual or
constructive possession. 3 8 Although these two decisions provide an
introduction to constructive possession, neither one concretely
established constructive possession as an applicable instrument for
proving possession in North Dakota criminal law.
It was State v. Morris3 9 that iestablished the application of the
doctrine of constructive possession in North Dakota criminal law as
sufficient proof of possession in controlled substance cases. 40 In Morris,
the supreme court affirmed a conviction for possession of controlled
substances with intent to deliver when the defendants were merely
passengers in a vehicle wherein marijuana was discovered by the
police. 4 ' The court ruled that "[p]ossession [of controlled substances]
may be actual or constructive, exclusive or joint, and may be shown
entirely by circumstantial evidence," and that "[t]o prove constructive
possession the State must present evidence which establishes that the
accused had the power and capability to exercise dominion and control
over the contraband." 4 2 Also, since the offense is a strict liability crime
requiring no mens rea "[tihe State ...does not have to prove either (1)
the accused had knowledge of the presence of the drug, or (2) the
accused had knowledge of the identity of the substance ....",43

until he placed it under the back seat, where it was discovered by the police search. Id. at 885. The
court reasoned that it had sufficient evidence to affirm the conviction in view of the other drug-related
paraphernalia found in the vehicle, under the front seat, and in the pocket of defendant's coat. Id.
35. Id.
36. State v. Lind, 332 N.W.2d 826, 846 (N.D. 1982).
37. 332 N.W. 2d 826 (N.D. 1982).
38. State v. Lind, 332 N.W.2d 826, 846 (N.D. 1982) (ruling that if the judge's instruction was in
error, it was merely harmless error).
39. 331 N.W.2d 48 (N.D. 1983).
40. State v. Morris, 331 N.W.2d 48, 53-54 (N.D. 1983).
41. Id. at 54-55.
42, Id. at 53 (citing Larson, 274 N.W.2d 884). See infra note 56 and accompanying text (defining
the Wilkie standard for a conviction based on constructive possession as "requir[ing] that the facts
permit the inference of an intent to possess" and that '[u]nless actual control exists, there must be
found from the surrounding facts and circumstances, aided by reasonable inferences, an intent to
exercise control over the prohibited item[]").
43. Morris, 331 N.W.2d at 54 (citations omitted).
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The court's holding in Morris remains the North Dakota standard
for proving possession in controlled substance cases. 44 However, the
Morris standard was notably narrowed when it was applied to a minor in
possession charge.4 5 In Wahpeton v. Wilkie.46 a juvenile defendant was
found not to be in violation of the possession ordinance when his
co-renter held a party at their residence in which the defendant neither
participated nor drank any of the available alcohol, but was present at the
location when the police investigated. 47 The City of Wahpeton argued
that the defendant should be found guilty of possession based on
constructive possession pursuant to Morris.4 8 However, the court in
Wilkie relied on the Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision of In re R.B.49
In re R.B.50 is factually similar to In re K.S. in that it involved a
juvenile who attended a beer party but "denied obtaining beer, drinking
beer, or5 intending to drink beer," and alleged he was at the party only to
"visit." 1 In In re R.B., the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court and found that without proof of actual possession, evidence of an
"intent to possess" is required for a conviction. 52 Thus, with insufficient
evidence to establish an "intent to possess," R.B. was found innocent.5 3
In accordance with In re R.B., the court in Wilkie found that "a
conviction based on constructive possession 'requires that the facts
permit the inference of an intent to possess . . . [u]nless actual control
exists, [then] there must be found from the surrounding facts and
circumstances, aided by reasonable inferences, an intent to exercise
control over the prohibited item." 54 This language narrows the Morris
standard for constructive possession by adding a requirement to prove
an intent to possess or exercise control over the prohibited item. 55 The

44. See State v. Dymowski, 458 N.W.2d 490. 499-500 (N.D. 1990) (applying the Morris
standard); State v. Connery, 441 N.W.2d 651, 655 (N.D. 1989) (applying the Morris standard). But
see State v. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d 175 (N.D. 1989) (adding an affirmative defense of unwitting or
unknowing possession for charges of possession of a controlled substance, despite the fact that the
offense is a strict liability crime in which mens rea elements such as "unwitting" and "unknowing"
should be irrelevant).
45. Wahpeton v. Wilkie, 477 N.W.2d 215, 216-17 (N.D. 1991).
46. 477 N.W.2d 215 (N.D. 1991).
47. Wahpeton v. Wilkie, 477 N.W.2d 215, 216 (N.D. 1991).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 216-17 (quoting In re R.B.. 322 N.W.2d 502. 503 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982)).
50. 322 N.W.2d 502 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982).
51. In re R.B.. 322 N.W.2d 502, 503 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Wilkie, 477 N.W.2d at 216-17 (quoting In re R.B.. 322 N.W.2d 502, 503 (Wis. Ct. App.
1982)).
55. Id. The Morris standard does not require proof of an intent to possess, but only that the
accused had the power and culpability to exercise dominion and control over the contraband. State v.
Morris, 331 N.W.2d 48. 53 (N.D. 1983).
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supreme court was unable to find sufficient evidence in Wilkie to
constitute an "intent to [possess or] exercise control" over an alcoholic
beverage; thus, no possession, actual or constructive, existed on the part
of the defendant. 5 6
The Wilkie decision is important because it is the first time the North
Dakota Supreme Court applied the Morris standard of constructive
possession to an offense other than possession of controlled substances. 57 Furthermore, it concludes by showing that although the liberal
Morris standard of constructive possession is sufficient for controlled
substance cases, the standard for minor in possession of alcohol cases
will apply a different theory of constructive possession which is more
strict and requires proof of an intent to possess the contraband. 5 8
III. ANALYSIS
In In re K.S., the North Dakota Supreme Court examined what
constitutes "possession" under North Dakota's minor in possession of an
alcoholic beverage statute,5 9 and specifically, whether possession should

56. Wilkie. 477 N.W.2d at 218. The court reasoned that being a co-renter with the party's host is
not enough evidence to constitute constructive possession absent an "additional link" showing some
control or possession of the alcohol by the minor defendant. Id.
57. Id. Several other states have previously addressed the issue of constructive possession in
relation to minor in possession offenses. See Kastl v. State, 796 S.W.2d 848. 850 (Ark. App. 1990)
(ruling that "evidence that there were beer cans beside the [juvenile's] vehicle, that beer was found in
the immediate proximity of the appellant in the vehicle, and that there was the smell of beer on the
applicant's person" was insufficient to establish that the juvenile appellant constructively possessed the
beer found in the car absent any "additional link' between the juvenile and the beer); State v. Harris,
352 N.W.2d 581, 582 (Neb. 1984) (requiring the state to prove that a juvenile had 'knowledge and
consciousness of possession" in order to support a conviction based on constructive possession for a
minor being in possession of alcohol); State v. Embrey, 198 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Neb. 1972) (finding
sufficient evidence to indicate "knowledge and consciousness of possession" when minors were
observed leaving a bar carrying beer, avoiding the patrol car when driving away, and when pulled
over open beer was discovered and the juvenile had alcohol on his breath); State v. Eberhardt. 125
N.W.2d 1, 4 (Neb. 1963) (involving a juvenile who was using his mother's car in which two bottles of
beer were discovered on the front floor; the court found that there was insufficient evidence to prove
constructive possession since the juvenile had no knowledge of the alcohol until the search and seizure
by the officer); State v. Hornaday, 713 P.2d 71,74 (Wash. 1986) (finding that 'constructive possession
of liquor denotes control of the substance." and that in order to sustain a conviction for minor in
possession of alcohol, the state must prove that the defendant "exercise[d] 'dominion or control' over
[the] substance"). See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (regarding In re R.B. and the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals opinion on the issue).
58. Wilkie, 477 N.W.2d at 217-18. But cf. supra note 55 (regarding the Morris standard for
possession).
59. The North Dakota minor in possession of alcohol statute reads:
Except as permitted in this section and section 5-02-06. any person under twenty-one
years of age purchasing or attempting to purchase alcoholic beverages, consuming
alcoholic beverages other than during a religious service, being under the influence of
alcoholic beverages, or being in possession of alcoholic beverages, or furnishing money
to any person for such purchase, or entering any licensed premises where alcoholic
beverages are being sold or displayed, except a restaurant when accompanied by a
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be actual or constructive. 60 The state argued that since K.S. knowingly
attended a party at which K.S. knew alcoholic beverages would be
available, K.S. was guilty of possession via Morris and the doctrine of
constructive possession. 6 1 Furthermore, the state argued that the offense
is a strict liability crime 6 2 and therefore, according to State v.
Michlitsch,63 her only defense is the affirmative defense of being an
unwitting or unknowing possessor. 64 Thus, the state contended that since
K.S. constructively possessed alcoholic beverages and "did not avail
herself of the affirmative defense . . . of unwitting or unknowing
possession," "she is strictly liable for the offense of minor in possession
of [alcohol]." 6 5 K.S. maintained that the minor in possession statute
does not create a strict liability offense, and that the juvenile court ruled
correctly in finding that mere presence, absent any proof of purchase,
consumption, control, or intent to control or consume, did not constitute
a violation of the statute. 66 ,.
The court began its analysis of the state's argument by agreeing that
the minor in possession statute creates a strict liability crime. 67 The court
noted that there is no culpable mental state defined within the statute, and

parent or legal guardian or in accordance with section 5-02-06, or if the person is a law
enforcement officer entering the premises in the performance of official duty, is guilty
of a class B misdemeanor. The court may, under this section, refer the person to an
outpatient addiction facility licensed by the state department of human services for
evaluation and appropriate counseling or treatment.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-08 (1987 & Supp. 1993).
K.S. was also in violation of the Grand Forks minor in possession city ordinance which, in
relevant part. states:
It shall be unlawful for any person under the age of 21 years to:
1. Purchase or attempt to purchase alcoholic beverages;
2. Consume alcoholic beverages other than during a religious service;
3. Be under the influence of alcoholic beverages; or
4. Possess alcoholic beverages, except as otherwise permitted in Section 21-0222.
GRAND FoRiKs. N.D., ORDINANCE No. 3188 (1992).
However, because the North Dakota Century Code provides that crimes defined by state law
shall not be "superseded by any city or county ordinance" K.S. was only prosecuted for the state
offense. In re K.S. 500 N.W.2d at 605, citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-05 (1985).
60. In re K.S., 500 N.W.2d 603, 605-07 (N.D. 1993).
61. Id. at 605-06.
62. Id.
63. 438 N.W.2d 175 (N.D. 1989).
64. Id.. see State v. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d 175, 178 (N.D. 1989) (creating an affirmative
defense of unwitting or unknowing possession for strict liability possession of a controlled substance).
65. In re K.S., 500 N.W.2d at 605.
66. Id. at 604.
67. Id. at 606.
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the Century Code does not provide any guidance on the degree of
culpability required for crimes outside the scope of Title 12.1.68
However, the North Dakota Supreme Court had previously ruled that
section 39-08-07,69 another criminal statute outside the scope of Title
12.1 which does not define a culpability requirement, is a strict liability
offense. 7 0 Thus, in In re K.S., the court reasoned by analogy that the
minor in possession statute creates a strict liability offense, which marked
the first determination by the North Dakota Supreme Court of the
71
culpability required for proof of the offense.
Having determined that the offense is a strict liability crime, the
court turned its attention towards interpreting the word "possession" as
used in the statute. 72 Finding the legislative history to be "unrevealing,"
the court turned to the "manifest purpose and design" of the statute and
its "plain language." 7 3 The court reasoned that the "manifest purpose
and design" of the statute was "to dissuade minors from consuming
alcohol." 74 However, the court found it "difficult to imagine how this...
objective would be effectuated by convicting minors of a crime when
they have not actually taken alcohol into their control." 75 Furthermore,
the court found that limiting the statute's definition of possession to
include actual possession, and not constructive possession, would "avoid
any implication that a minor may be chargeable when parents or
76
guardians keep alcoholic beverages in the home for their own use."
The court found this type of absurd enforcement situation to be outside
the scope of the statute because "an ambiguous statute [should be

68. Id. Title 12.1 is the North Dakota Century Code title on crimes. But see N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-02-02(2) (1985) (stating that "[i]f a statute or regulation thereunder defining a crime does not
specify any culpability and does not provide explicitly that a person may be guilty without culpability,
the culpability that is required is willfully"). However, the North Dakota Supreme Court has held that
this provision applies only to crimes described in title 12.1 of the Century Code, and not to other crimes
described outside of title 12.1. Dickinson v. Mueller, 261 N.W.2d 787, 789 (N.D. 1977). Thus. section
12.1-02-02(2) was inapplicable in In re K.S. See In re K.S., 500 N.W.2d at 606, n. 3.
69. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-07 (1993) (mandating that the offense of striking an unattended
vehicle is a class A misdemeanor).
70. In re K.S.. 500 N.W.2d at 606 (citing State v. Nygaard. 447 N.W.2d 267, 271 (N.D. 1989)
(citing State v. Olson, 356 N.W.2d 110, 112 (N.D. 1984))).
71. Id. Although Wilkie involved a dispute concerning the minor in possession of alcohol statute,
the court never made a determination of the culpability required to prove a violation of the offense.
Wahpeton v. Wilkie. 477 N.W.2d 215 (N.D. 1991).
72. In re K.S., 500 N.W.2d at 606-07.
73. ld.
74. Id. at 606.
75. Id.
76. In re K.S., 500 N.W.2d at 607 (reasoning that the doctrine of constructive possession, as
applied to the minor in possession of alcohol offense, is overbroad and would create "obvious
enforcement difficulty").
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construed] to avoid an absurd meaning." 77 Thus, "under [the minor in
possession of alcohol statute], 'possession' requires that a minor exercise
some degree of actual dominion or control over an alcoholic
beverage. "78
Besides the statutory rules of construction, the court also found
support for its definition of possession in prior case law. 7 9 The court
cited its previous decision in In re J.D.,80 which involved a juvenile
defendant who was a passenger in a car that was being driven without the
owner's consent. 8 1 In In re J.D., the court found that the juvenile was not
"exercis[ing] control" sufficient to establish unauthorized use of a motor
vehicle when the juvenile did not exercise any "authority, direction or
command over the car."82 The court in In re K.S. found this reasoning
to be consistent with the logic applied in this case in that mere presence,
absent some command or control over the prohibited item, is insufficient
83
for imposing criminal liability.
Next, the In re K.S. court commended the juvenile court's reliance
upon Wilkie. 84 The court stated that it agreed with the Wilkie determination that a minor in possession of alcohol conviction, based on
constructive rather than actual possession, requires that the surrounding
facts and circumstances "permit the inference of an intent to possess" the
85
alcoholic beverage.
The supreme court's agreement with the juvenile court's application
of Wilkie provides for some interesting analysis. For example, the court
stated that it was "confining [the] strict liability offense to actual
possession," 86 and it held that "possession," under the minor in possession
statute, requires proof of "some degree of actual dominion or control
over an alcoholic beverage." 8 7 Thus, the court appears to be limiting the
definition of possession, as used in the statute, to actual possession.
However, the definition of possession in Wilkie includes constructive

77. Id. (citing Aanenson v. Bastien, 438 N.W.2d 151, 156 (N.D. 1989)),
78. Id. at 608.
79. Id. at 607.
80. 494 N.W.2d 160 (N.D. 1992).
81. In re K.S., 500 N.W.2d at 607 (citing In re J.D., 494 N.W.2d 160, 164 (N.D. 1992)).
82. In re J.D., 494 N.W.2d at 164. It must be proven that the actor was "exercis[ing] control" in
order to establish the requisite culpability for the offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-06(1) (1985).
83. In re K.S., 500 N.W.2d at 607; see Wilkie, 477 N.W.2d 215, 218 (N.D. 1991) (quoting City of
Carbondale v. Nelson, 484 N.E.2d 392, 394 (Ill. Ct. App. 1985), which stated that "proximity" alone by
the minor defendant is not enough evidence for the state "to prove [an] ordinance violation by a clear
preponderance of the evidence").
84. In re K.S., 500 N.W.2d at 607.
85. Id. at 608.
86. Id. at 607.
87. Id. at 608.
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possession.8 8 Also, the Wilkie definition of constructive possession
requires proof of an "intent to possess."8 9 However, the court in In re
K.S. ruled that the minor in possession of alcohol offense is a strict
liability crime, theoretically making intent irrelevant. 9 0 Therefore, in
order to reconcile the In re K.S. court's adoption of Wilkie with its
holding, one must look at the court's possible reasons for adopting
Wilkie.
One argument for the In re K.S. court's seemingly inconsistent
position is that the court was only agreeing with the juvenile court's
application of Wilkie as support for the premise that mere presence,
knowledge, and proximity are insufficient to constitute possession. 9 1
This argument avoids including constructive possession and intent within
the In re K.S. definition of possession, and thus, effectively reconciles the
court's holding with its statements of agreement. Proponents of this
argument assert that the court's definition of possession, requiring actual
possession, is an effort to eliminate the interpretation problems which are
inherent in the doctrine of constructive possession and which cause
many practitioners difficulty. 92
Another argument can be made that the In re K.S. court's requirement of "some degree of actual dominion and control" 93 does not mean
actual possession. Rather, it can be argued that the words "some
degree" 94 of actual dominion and control only calls for proof of "intent
to possess," 95 thus making the Wilkie definition applicable and consistent
with the holding. The In re K.S. court's adoption of Wilkie and its
definition of possession strongly support this argument. 9 6 Further
support for this argument can be found in the court's statement that the
"circumstances of knowledge and proximity alone are not enough to
establish actual possession, without some evidence that K.S. was there to
drink alcohol." 97 It can be inferred from this statement that circumstan-

88. Wilkie, 477 N.W.2d at 216-17.
89. Id. at 216 (quoting In re R.B., 322 N.W.2d 502, 503 (1982)).
90. See In re K.S., 500 N.W.2d at 606.
91. See Wilkie. 477 N.W.2d at 217-18 (stating that mere presence is not sufficient evidence to
support a conviction for possession).
92. See Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 14. at 751 (discussing the interpretation problems that
practitioners and courts have with the doctrine of constructive possession). See Singer, supra note 14.
at 982-83 (discussing the confusion surrounding possession due to the many "nuances of meaning"
such as actual, constructive, and strict liability possession, and also the fact that the differences
between the nuances are not distinct).
93. In re K.S.. 500 N.W.2d at 608.
94. Id.
95. Wilkie, 477 N.W.2d at 216 (citing In re R.B., 322 N.W.2d at 503).
96. In re K.S., 500 N.W.2d at 607 (stating that the juvenile court "properly relied" upon the
court's decision in Wilkie).
97. Id. at 608.
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tial evidence plus an intent to possess or drink alcohol will be sufficient
for imposing liability despite no actual possession. This inference
strongly suggests that the holding in In re K.S. does not truly require
proof of actual possession for a conviction, but rather possession as it is
defined in Wilkie. Accordingly, a conviction could be established by
proving either actual possession, or constructive possession based on
proof of an intention to possess, control, or consume alcoholic
beverages.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
It is not clear which of the aforementioned arguments are correct;
however, it seems likely that the second approach is the interpretation the
court was pursuing. Defining possession within the statute as "actual
possession" would create enforcement problems for law officers.
Inevitably, minors will hide or discard their alcoholic beverages before
police can investigate, thus destroying any proof of actual possession.
Further, the "manifest purpose and design" of the statute "to dissuade
minors from drinking alcohol" 98 would be hindered by this restrictive
interpretation of possession. Thus, it seems likely that the court was
seeking a definition of possession similar to that of Wilkie which includes
constructive possession and intent. 99 This definition would ease the
burden of proof for law enforcement officials, yet it would only permit
the conviction of minors who intended to possess alcoholic beverages
rather than those who were merely in the presence of alcoholic
beverages. An intent to possess would probably be established if the
minor had paid any money toward the purchase of alcohol, if the minor
or any witnesses testified that the minor had expressed an intention to
possess alcohol, or if the minor is in the presence of large quantities of
alcohol and only a few other people are present. None of these
situations involve actual possession, but nevertheless, they would indicate
a minor's intention to illegally possess alcohol. Therefore, in order to
accomplish the goal of convicting only those minors who have an
intention of possessing alcohol, it seems necessary that the holding in In
re K.S. would continue to encompass some vestiges of constructive
possession.
Although the precise definition of possession in the context of the
minor in possession of alcohol statute remains unclear, it is clear that the
Morris definition of possession in controlled substances cases is not the

98. Id. at 606.
99. Wilkie, 477 N.W.2d at 216.
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applicable definition for this offense. 100 This raises the question of why
possession should be defined differently in controlled substance cases
than in alcohol offenses. Public policy is most likely the driving force
behind the distinction since it has advocated stronger regulation of
controlled substances compared to alcohol. 101 This is shown by the fact
that controlled substances are legal only in limited circumstances, such as
medical prescriptions, whereas alcohol is only illegal for a certain age
group. Thus, it seems reasonable that the two areas have differing
standards of proof for illegal possession.
Another point of interest arises from Justice Neumann's concurring
opinion.1 02 Justice Neumann wrote separately to "emphasize that the
circumstances in this case are significantly different from those in which
alcohol is found in an automobile full of minors." 10 3 This raises the
question of why the definition of possession differs for minors in a
house than minors in a car. Perhaps Justice Neumann was concerned
about minors drinking and driving, and therefore advocated a broader
interpretation of possession in those cases; or perhaps he found the two
situations factually different because a car is a more confined space than
a house, and thus its more difficult for a minor to show a lack of an
intent to possess. Justice Neumann did not state any reasons for the
distinction; however, he did seem to indicate that possession should be
determined according to the factual circumstances of the case. It can be
inferred from this distinction that he was attempting to interpret the
statute in a case-specific manner, rather than imposing a hard-line rule
requiring proof of actual possession.
In conclusion, many North Dakota practitioners may be confused
about the precise definition of possession within the minor in possession
of alcohol statute. Defense attorneys may argue that actual possession,
or direct physical control, must be proven in order to convict, while
prosecutors will likely argue that vestiges of constructive possession, such
as proof of intent to possess, still remain in the definition. A close
analysis of the court's opinion in In re K.S. seems to favor the latter
argument. Regardless, one method of enforcement should undisputably

100. The Morris standard for possession can be satisfied merely by proving circumstances such
as knowledge, proximity, and presence. State v. Morris, 331 N.W.2d, 48, 54 (N.D. 1983). Both Wilkie
and In re K.S. reject this standard as a means of establishing sufficient evidence to constitute
possession. In re K.S., 500 N.W.2d 603, 608 (N.D. 1993).
101. See Donald B. King, Note, Possession of Dangerous Drugs in Indiana, 8 IND. L. REV. 690,
711-14 (1975) (discussing the general risk to the community of narcotic drugs because of their
addictive nature).
102. In re K.S., 500 N.W.2d at 608.
103. Id.
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satisfy the burden of proof under the minor in possession of alcohol
statute: simply catch them with a can.
Donald T. Campbell

